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Notes and Discussions 
Nietzsche and Aestheticism 
1o 
Alexander  Nehamas's  Nietzsche: L~fe as Literature' has enjoyed an enthusiastic recept ion 
since its publication in 1985 . Reviewed in a wide ar ray  of  scholarly journals  and even in 
the popular  press, the book has won praise nearly everywhere and has already ea rned  
for N e h a m a s - - a t  least in the intellectual communi ty  at l a r g e - - t h e  reputat ion as the 
preeminent  American Nietzsche scholar. At  least two features o f  the book may help  
explain this phenomenon.  
First, Nehamas's  Nietzsche is an imaginative synthesis o f  several important  currents  
in recent Nietzsche commentary ,  reflecting the influence o f  writers like Jacques Der- 
rida, Sarah Kofman, Paul De Man, and  Richard Rorty. These  authors  figure, often by 
name, th roughout  Nehamas 's  book; and  it is perhaps  Nehamas's  most impor tan t  
achievement to have of fered  a read ing  o f  Nietzsche that incorporates  the insights o f  
these writers while surpassing them all in the philosophical ingenuity with which this 
style of  in terpre t ing  Nietzsche is developed.  T h e  high profile that many o f  these 
thinkers now enjoy on the intellectual landscape accounts in part  for the recept ion 
accorded the "Nietzsche" they so deeply  influenced.  
Second, Nehamas has effected this synthesis primari ly th rough  the introduct ion o f  
a novel interpret ive rubric:  what Nehamas  calls "aestheticism."'  According to aestheti-  
cism, " N i e t z s c h e . . .  looks at [the world] as if  it were a l i terary text. And  he arrives at 
many of  his views o f  human  beings by general izing to them ideas and principles that 
apply almost intuitively to the l i terary situation, to the creation and interpreta t ion o f  
' (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, ,985); all further references will be included 
in the body of the text. I will cite Nietzsche's texts (by section number) using the standard English- 
language acronyms: The Birth of Tragedy (BT); Human, AU-Too-Human (HAH); Daybreak (D); The 
Gay Science (GS); Thu~ Spoke Zarathustra (Z); Beyond Good and Ev//(BGE); On the Genealogy of Morals 
(GM); Twilight of the Idols (TI); The Antichrist (A); Ecce Homo (EH); Nietzsche contra Wagner (NCW); 
The Case of Wagner (CW); The Will to Power (WP). Translations are by Kaufmann or Kaufmanrd 
Hollingdale, except for HAH (trans. Faber & Lehmann) and D (trans. Hollingdale). 
9 Allan MegiU also uses the term "aestheticism" in a related way in his Prophets of Extremity: 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida (Berkeley: University of California Press, ,985); e.g., p. 2:"1 
am using ["aestheticism"] to r e f e r . . ,  to an attempt to expand the aesthetic to embrace the whole 
of reality. To put it another way, I am using it to refer to a tendency to see 'art' or 'language' or 
'discourse' or 'text' as constituting the primary realm of human experience." MegiU, it should be 
noted, pursues this theme in Nietzsche less relentlessly and also less artfully than Nehamas. 
[275] 
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li terary texts and  characters"  (3). For  Nehamas,  then, the l i terary text is Nietzsche's 
"overarching metaphor"  (164), the "model"  he "always d e p e n d e d  on" (194) in pursu-  
ing his philosophical  inquiries, " the single thread runn ing  through"  his work.s And  
according to at least one  commenta tor ,  it is through Nehamas 's  "ingenious employ- 
ment  of  an aesthetic model"  that he "has dramatically raised the s tandards  o f  Nietzsche 
scholarship."4 
While there is clearly much to admi re  in Nehamas's  book, I should like to raise here  
a skeptical question about  Nehamas 's  extensive use of  this aestheticist model:  for  aes- 
theticism, I suggest, is actually not Nietzsche's view. In the next  two sections, I will 
concentrate on one way in which this problem surfaces: namely,  in Nehamas 's  fai lure 
to adduce a single passage f rom Nietzsche in which he actually embraces aestheticism. 
But the problem is also appa ren t  in Nehamas's  a t tempt  to show that aestheticism 
informs Nietzsche's t r ea tment  o f  d i f ferent  issues: perspectivism, the na ture  o f  the self, 
the will to power,  the cri t ique o f  morality,  his positive ethics. In  section 4, I shall 
explore  jus t  the last o f  these, and  suggest how aestheticism leads Nehamas  to an 
idiosyncratic read ing  o f  Nietzsche's positive views. 
9 .  
Nehamas, as we have seen, claims that  "aestheticism" informs all o f  Nietzsche's philo- 
sophical work. He  even a t tempts  to show that  there  is "explicit" textual suppor t  for  
aestheticism: text, that  is, where  Nietzsche claims this putatively "overarching" d e v i c e - -  
unders tanding  the world as it if were a l i terary t ex t - -a s  his own. And,  in fact, we should 
expect  nothing less: if aestheticism is really central to Nietzsche's philosophical  practice 
then we should expect  him to say so - - somewhere .  Yet, as I will show below, o f  the e/ght 
f ragmentary  quotes and references  that  Nehamas invokes as "explicit" suppor t  of  aes- 
theticism (see 39, 6z, 9 o - 9  t ,  zz7) half  are  actually incompatible with aestheticism, while 
the remainder  a l lude to art ,  l i terature,  texts, and in terpre ta t ion in a way that fails to 
warrant  ascription o f  an overarching  philosophical methodology.  Moreover,  Nehamas 
ignores the passages in which Nietzsche identifies his methodology  and basic assump- 
tions in essentially na tu ra l i s t i c - -no t  aesthet ic is t - - terms.  
Before tu rn ing  to these passages, however, it is impor tant  to be clear about  what is 
really at issue. No one disputes  that  Nietzsche, reflecting no doubt  his t ra ining as a 
philologist, often speaks metaphorical ly  of  the world as a "text" to be in terpreted.  Let 
us call this common Nietzschean way o f  talking "interpretivism."s 
s Emphasis added. This last remark appears on the dust jacket of the book: Nehamas "reveals 
the single thread running through Nietzsche's views: his thinking of the world on the model of 
the literary text . . . .  " 
4 Daniel Conway, "Literature as Life: Nietzsche's Positive Morality," International Studies in 
Philosophy ~ l/~ (1989): 41. 
s Nietzsche emphasizes the interpretive character of knowledge because he wants to reject what 
he identifies as the positivist aspiration of unmediated confrontation with the "facts" about the 
world. The famous passage (WP, 481), for example, in which Nietzsche asserts that "facts is pre- 
cisely what there is not, only interpretations," is explicitly a critique of"positivism, which halts at phe- 
nomena." Thus, Nietzsche's emphasis on interpretive mediation in our knowledge of the world is 
centrally an ei0/stemo/og/ca/thesis, and not a declaration of an overarching methodology. For further 
NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS ~77 
Aestheticism, however,  is a s t ronger  thesis; it claims that in terpreta t ion of  the text 
of  the world is like (a certain sort of)/ / terary interpreta t ion in two key respects: 
(i) the world and  l i terary texts are essentially indeterminate ,  so that both admit  of  a 
plurality of  conflicting interpretat ions;  and  
(ii) the world and  its occupants have features that  we ordinari ly  associate with liter- 
ary texts and l i terary characters. 
It is these two novel claims that require  independen t  textual support ;  yet, as I discuss 
below, Nehamas tends to conflate aestheticism with interpretivism, taking evidence o f  
the latter as suppor t  for  the former.  But the two views are  simply not  equivalent. 
For one thing, Nietzsche unders tands  "interpretat ion" in the manner  of  a serious 
philologist, not  a f l ippant  post-modernis t :  6 Nietzsche wants to defend,  as he puts it, 
"the art  o f  read ing  we l lmof  reading  facts without falsifying them by interpretat ion" 
(A, 52). Good interpret ive  practice that  does not falsify the "facts" o f  the text would 
seem to comprise a very d i f ferent  "art" f rom that contemplated by aestheticism, which 
emphasizes "that l i terary texts can be in terpre ted  equa//y well in vastly different  and 
deeply incompatib/e ways" (3, emphasis  added) .  But if "deeply incompatible" interpreta-  
tions are "equally" good, then what constraint  on interpreta t ion could the text exer-  
cise? And  what room could there be for  the idea o f  an interpreta t ion "falsifying" the 
"facts" o f  the text? 
Note, however, that the upshot  o f  this difference between the aestheticist and Nietz- 
schean conceptions o f  in terpre ta t ion is only this: namely, that  Nietzsche, the non-post- 
modern philologist, could not have been using the "text" metaphor  to suppor t  the sort o f  
views Nehamas labels "aestheticism." I f  Nietzsche held such views--if ,  for example,  he 
did believe that the world admits  of  a plural i ty of  incompat/b/e in te rpre ta t ions r - - then  we 
will require o ther  proof.  It is simply anachronistic,  however, to at tr ibute aestheticism to 
Nietzsche on the basis of  his talk of" texts"  and "interpretat ion";  it is to assume (wrongly) 
that Nietzsche learned the art  o f  in terpre ta t ion  at the feet o f  De Man instead of  Ritschl. s 
discussion of what this epistemological thesis amounts to, see my "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's 
Genealogy of Morals," in R. Schacht, ed., Essays on Nietzsche's "Genea/0gy of Morals" (Berkeley: Uni- 
versity of Cafifornia Press, forthcoming), especially Section IV [cited hereafter as "Perspectivism"]. 
~s See generally, Hendrik Birus, "Nietzsche's Concept of Interpretation," Texte 3 (1984): 87- 
109, which is a useful counterweight to the various "French" Nietzsches (though Birus'sjudgment 
on some more purely philosophical matters is a bit uneven). One must remember that nineteenth- 
century Germans had a very different conception of the interpretation of texts than that now 
popular in literary-theory circles. As M. S. Silk and J. P. Stern point out in Nietzsche on Tragedy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), German classical scholarship of that period 
"added a new 'scientific' method" in which the "ancient world, its texts and its history, were 
submitted to critical analysis with an unprecedented thoroughness, sense of system and concern 
for evidence that was, in intention at least, dispassionate" (l l). They go on to note that Nietzsche's 
early philological studies "exhibit all the familiar features of nineteenth-century 'scientific' scholar- 
ship" (16). Nietzsche, himself, gives expression to such a conception of interpretation and philol- 
ogy in his later work (e.g., A, 59). 
For some arguments that he didn't, see my "Perspectivism." 
s Friedrich Ritschl, an eminent German classical philologist, was Nietzsche's mentor during 
his days as a graduate student. 
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Aestheticism cannot  be conflated with interpret ivism for a second reason: Nietz- 
sche simply does not in terpre t  the world as though it shared the features o f  a literary 
text; on the contrary,  a recur r ing  theme in his work is that what he is in terpre t ing  is a 
natural world with part icular  sorts o f  natural attributes (e.g., BGE, 230; A, 14). Since 
this issue goes to the hear t  o f  what  is problematic  about aestheticism, let me pause to 
consider here  two examples  of  how Nehamas 's  aestheticism leads him to misconstrue 
Nietzsche's naturalism.9 
While Nehamas  cites BGE, 930 (on ~ )  as evidence of  Nietzsche's al leged embrace  
of  aestheticism, this passage actually gives clear expression instead to one of  Nietzsche's 
most impor tant  philosophical  imperat ives:  naturalism. Nietzsche decries those who 
stop with "mere  a p p e a r a n c e . . ,  m a s k s . . ,  cloaks, in s h o r t , . . ,  the surface" and con- 
trasts them with "the seeker  af ter  knowledge" who argues that "the basic text o f  homo 
natura must again be recognized":  
To  translate man back into nature ;  to become master over the many vain and overly 
enthusiastic in terpreta t ions  and  connotat ions that have so far  been scrawled and 
painted over that eternal basic text  [emphasis added]  of  homo natura; to see to it that  
man hencefor th  stands before  man  as even today, hardened in the discipline of science 
[emphasis added] ,  he stands before  the rest of  nature,  with in t repid  Oedipus  eyes 
and sealed Odysseus ears, dea f  to the siren songs o f  old metaphysical  bird catchers 
who have been piping at him all too long, "you are more,  you are  higher ,  you are  o f  a 
different  o r ig in ! " - - t ha t  may be a s t range and insane task, but it is a task--who would 
deny that? Why did we choose this insane task [emphasis added]? Or,  put t ing it differ-  
endy: "why have knowledge at all?" 
Nietzsche identifies this agenda  for  phi losophy (with the royal "we") as his task; and the 
task is to reveal the "eternal  basic text": homo natura. Nehamas no doubt  cites this 
passage because o f  Nietzsche's use o f  the word "text": but it is decidedly a use of  "text" 
unsuited to suppor t ing  aestheticism. 
On the aestheticist reading,  recall, for Nietzsche to treat  knowledge of  the world as 
interpretat ion of  a text is to invoke ou r  sense, as Nehamas says, that  "l i terary texts can 
be in terpreted equally well in vastly d i f ferent  and  deeply incompat ible  ways" and thus 
to suggest that "exactly the same is t rue  of  the world itself and  all the things within it" 
(3). 
p Nietzsche shares with other broadly "naturalistic" thinkers the ambition of understanding 
human beings as continuous parts of the natural world order, but he differs markedly in not 
assigning a privileged place to the prevailing science of the day in this account. He parts company 
in this respect because: (i) he takes modern science--from physics to psychology--to involve 
various moral prejudices that ultimately distort its account of the world order and of human 
beings (though, at the same time, he admires scientific methods [e.g., A, 59; see also GM, III, 23]); 
and (ii) he rejects mechanistic accounts of phenomena. I hope to take up some of the issues 
Nietzsche's unusual nonreductive naturalism presents elsewhere. For a useful account of the 
prevailing naturalistic mood in Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century, see Hans 
Sluga, Frege (London: Routledge, 198o), Chapter l; for an account of the influence of Friedrich 
Lange's naturalism on Nietzsche--though one that unnecessarily overstates its case--see George 
Stack, Lange and Nietzsche (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1983). 
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But Nietzsche's invocation of  "text" in BGE, , 3  o is not  to this effect at all: Zo he 
asserts that pr ior  claims to "knowledge" (e.g., "metaphysics") have been superfic/a2 
precisely because they have ignored the "eternal  basic text" (ew/gen Grundtext) o f  man 
conceived as a natural  organism. Tha t  this text is eternal  and basic implies not that it 
"can be in terpre ted  equally well in vastly d i f ferent  and deeply incompatible ways" but  
just  the opposite:  that readings which do  not  t reat  man naturalistically misread the 
t ex t - - they  "falsify" it. And  it is precisely such misreadings of" texts"  that  Nietzsche the 
"good philologist" aims to correct. 
So the descript ion o f  the text of  horn0 natura as "eternal" and  "basic," the contrast  with 
superficial claims to knowledge,  and the passage's character  as a methodological  procla- 
mation, all suggest that  Nietzsche wants to establish the proper  start ing point  for knowl- 
edge, and in so doing to rule out  a whole host of  compet ing and incompatible interpreta-  
tions of  man. These  naturalistic ambitions are, it seems, distinctly unaestheticist. 
A second and similarly misleading characterization of  Nietzsche's view results when 
Nehamas cites GM, II ,  i a to suppor t  the proposi t ion that "the will to power manifests 
itself in offer ing re interpreta t ions"  (97), and then goes on to suggest, in keeping with 
aestheticism, that in terpre ta t ion here  should be unders tood in a " w r i t e r l y . . .  l i terary 
way" (98). Now, in GM, II ,  i z, Nietzsche does say that: "all events in the organic world 
are a subduing,  a becoming master, and all subduing and becoming master  involves a fresh 
interpretat ion,  an adapta t ion  th rough  which any previous 'meaning '  and 'purpose '  are 
necessarily obscured or  even obli terated."  But note that: (a) Nietzsche does not assimi- 
late interpreta t ion here  to//terary interpreta t ion;  that conflation is Nehamas's;  and  (b) 
the passage is a descript ion of"events  in the organic wor ld ' - - i . e . ,  it proffers  an account 
of  natural  phenomena.  Later  in GM, II,  i a, Nietzsche complains that the "democratic  
idiosyncrasy which opposes  everything that dominates  and wants to dominate"  has 
"already taken charge of  all physiology and theory of  life" with the result that  "the 
essence o f  life, its w///to power, is ignored."  Will to power, then, appears  here  as a 
naturalistic hypothesis,  one designed to put  physiology and the " theory of  life" (as well as 
psychology) on the right track (see also, BGE, 13, a3, and the discussion below in section 
3, (2)). By assimilating the passage (which he cites without quoting) to l i terary interpreta-  
tion Nehamas misrepresents  its basic thrust:  i.e., to reorient  the naturalistic interpreta-  
tion of  man in terms o f  will to power. ~ 
Interpretivism, then, is not aestheticism: first, because Nietzsche, the nineteenth- 
century philologist, does not view "texts" and  "interpretat ions" in the manner  of  the 
twentieth-century post -modernis t  who seems the more likely p roponen t  of  aestheti- 
1o In fact, his use of"text" elsewhere in BGE is not to that effect either: e.g., a~, where he uses 
"text" as a synonym for "matter of fact" and in contrast with any "perversion of meaning." 
,I Maudemarie Clark has recently offered an interesting analysis of Nietzsche's treatment of 
will to power in his published works. See her Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 199o), Chapter 7. Clark argues persuasively that Nietzsche did not 
hold a "cosmological" doctrine of the will to power (the view that everything is essentially will to 
power); she argues less persuasively against any explanatory role for some notion of will to 
power--a role which it seems to me Nietzsche clearly (and rather plausibly) entertained (as the 
remarks from GM and BGE referred to in the text suggest). 
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cism; and second, because in his actual philosophical  practice, Nietzsche presents  him- 
self as in terpre t ing  a natural  world, a world describable (at least in significant part)  in 
terms o f  will to power.  This  is not  to deny that  Nietzsche thinks both art  ( though not  
particularly l i terature) and aesthetic value s tandards are extremely impor tant  (a poin t  
to which I shall return);  it is to deny,  however,  that he holds the unusual view that the 
natural  world and its occupants are  best in te rpre ted  as though they shared the features  
of  ( indeterminate)  l i terary texts and  o f  l i terary characters. 
3. 
Let us turn,  then, to consider  the remain ing  seven pieces o f  textual evidence of fe red  by 
Nehamas as putative p r o o f  o f  Nietzsche's embrace  of  aestheticism. 
(]) Near  the end o f  Chap te r  1, Nehamas writes that: "A central theme o f  this book 
is Nietzsche's aestheticism, his essential reliance on artistic models for under s t and ing  
the world and life and  for  evaluating people  and actions. This aestheticism results f rom 
his effort  to br ing  style into the center  o f  his own thought  and to repeat  once more  
what he took to be the grea t  achievement o f  the Greeks and Romans: to make o f  ' the 
grand style no longer  mere  ar t  b u t . . ,  reality, t ruth,  life' (A, 59)" (39). Nehamas cites A, 
59 as evidence o f  Nietzsche's "effort  to br ing  style into the center  o f  his own 
t h o u g h t " - - a n  effort  that  leads, claims Nehamas,  to aestheticism. The  question, then,  is 
whether  Nietzsche's conception o f  s t y l e - - m o r e  precisely, o f  the "grand style" o f  the 
Greeks and Romans - - i s  hospitable to aestheticism; whether  it is, in o ther  words, liter- 
ary style that  is pa r amoun t  in Nietzsche's mind.  
I f  one turns to the port ions o f  A, 59 that Nehamas does not quote,  it seems that it is 
not. For the aspects o f  the  "grand style" o f  the ancient world that  Nietzsche lauds are,  
e.g., its "sense for facts" and its "free eye before  reality." Nietzsche argues that precisely 
what dist inguished the Greeks  and Romans was their  capacity to confront  reality, and to 
do so by virtue o f  their  "scientific methods."  This  virtue would seem to be the natura l  
ant ipode to both (i) a l i terary style; and  (ii) the practice o f  in terpret ing "reality" on the 
model  of  l i terary works.~* 
(~) In Chapter  ~, Nehamas  asserts that:  "Nietzsche often construes the world as a 
text o f  which our  various practices and modes  of  life are  interpretat ions (see for  
example BGE, ~ ,  23o)" (62)?s 
BGE, 2~ is the famous passage contras t ing the physicist's in terpreta t ion o f  the 
world with Nietzsche's own in terpre ta t ion o f  the world as will to power, and  which 
concludes with Nietzsche remark ing  with respect  to his own view: "Supposing that  this 
also is only i n t e r p r e t a t i o n - - a n d  you will be eager  enough to make this o b j e c t i o n ? -  
well, so much the better."~4 
'* It might be objected that in A, 59, Nietzsche also has in mind "the incomparable art of 
reading well" and thus is, in fact, talking about literary interpretation here. That point may be 
well taken: but note that what is in play here is plainly the typical nineteenth-century philologist's 
conception of interpretation--which is not (as discussed earlier) the aestheficist conception. 
,s For discussion of BGE, ~3 o, see section ~ above. 
,4 It is worth noting (as Nehamas does not) that in BGE, 9~, Nietzsche calls the physicist's 
interpretation of the world a "perversion of meaning," involving a "bad mode of interpretation" 
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The issue, o f  course, is what we should conclude from this remark. As noted above, 
interpretivism does not collapse into aestheticism. That  Nietzsche calls the will to power 
an "interpretation" is certainly not on its face sufficient to sustain the aestheticist claim, 
e.g., that there is an appropriate literary analogue for Nietzsche's conception o f  will to 
power. Nietzsche does "interpret" the wor ld - -hu t  not as though it had the features of  a 
literary text. Rather, he interprets it as a world with certain ~tura/characteristics hereto- 
fore poorly grasped--as  the surrounding discussion of  will to power demonstrates. 
For example, in the following section, BGE, 23, Nietzsche suggests that in order  to 
restore psychology as the "queen of  the sciences" one must "understand it a s . . .  the 
doctrine of the development of the will to power." And in BGE, 13, Nietzsche challenges the 
physiological claim that "self-preservat ion. . .  [is] the cardinal instinct o f  an organic 
being"; to the contrary, Nietzsche asserts that "life is wi//to power; self-preservation is 
only one o f  the indirect and most frequent  results." It is not clear what literary analogue 
would illuminate Nietzsche's claim in these passages that psychology and physiology--  
as putatively naturalistic sciences--would do better to adopt the will to power hypothe- 
sis. In order  for these sciences to do more  successfully what they try to do- - in te rpre t  
nature qua nature--Nietzsche simply proposes they employ a better description o f  the 
relevant phenomena,  i.e., his notion o f  will to power. 
(3) In Chapter  3, in his most explicit attempt to offer a textual defense o f  aestheti- 
cism, Nehamas writes that: "Nietzsche's model for the world, for objects, and for 
people turns out to be the literary text and its components;  his model for our  relation 
to the world turns out to be interpretation. It is a model we find explicitly in his 
writing: 'Around the hero everything turns into a tragedy; around the demi-god, into 
9 a satyr-play; and around God- -wha t?  perhaps into "world"?' (BGE, 15o). Nietzsche's 
model is startling and paradoxical. And it is nowhere more so than in his writing o f  'the 
world as a work of  art that gives birth to itself' (WP, 796; cf. lo66)" (9o-91). BGE, 15o, 
which Nehamas quotes in its brief entirety, appears in the "Epigrams and Interludes" 
section of  Beyond Good and Evil; thus by itself it would hardly constitute sufficient 
textual support to buttress aestheticism as "the single thread" running through all o f  
Nietzsche's works. 
It is also far f rom clear that the moral to draw from this aphorism is that Nietzsche 
believes we should interpret the world as if it were a literary text. I f  we pursue the 
suggested analogy of  the aphorism, we should say that just as the "hero" and the 
"demi-god" are the fictional central figures in their respective literary genres, so too 
God has been the (fictional) central figure in one conception o f  the "world"--a  concep- 
tion, o f  course, that Nietzsche repeatedly attacks. Given that, it is not surprising that 
the "world" in which God figures should be viewed as yet another literary genre, 
precisely because its view of  the wor ld/s  unreal: as Nietzsche says o f  Christianity, it 
lacks "even a single point o f  contact with reality" (A, 15). 
In short, the analogy between the "world" and other literary genres turns on the 
and "bad 'philology' "; he refers to his own preferred view--the world as will to power--as an 
"opposite... mode of interpretation'--presumably meaning it is a "good" interpretation involv- 
ing "good" philoiog T. For further discussion, see my "Perspectivism." 
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issue: In what concept ion of  the "world" is God the central f igure (as the hero and the 
demi-god are  central  to their  respective li terary genres)? The  answer, of  course, is the 
religious conception o f  the world. And  given what Nietzsche thinks o f  that  (e.g., A, 
pass/m), it is not  surpr is ing  that he should treat  that conception itself as another  l i terary 
genre:  i.e., as "mere"  fiction. 
(4) WP, 796 reads  in its entirety as follows: 
The  work of  ar t  where it appears  without an artist, e.g., as body, as organization 
(Prussian officer corps,  Jesuit  order) .  To what extent  the artist is only a pre l iminary 
stage. 
The  world as a work o f  art  that  gives birth to i t se l f - -  
This may be the strongest  textual suppor t  Nehamas invokes on behalf  of  aestheticism. 
The  passage invites us to think o f  several en t i t i e s - - the  Prussian officer corps, the 
Jesuit  order ,  and  the w o r l d - - a s  works of  art  ( though not, however, as works of  
literature). But the passage does not  tell us precisely what this en ta i l s - - in  fact, it is 
perhaps  fair to say that  the ul t imate point  of  this passage is bafflingly obscure. Only 
by quoting the last line out  of  context  can Nehamas imply that it constitutes "explicit" 
suppor t  for aestheticism. 
Let me offer,  in any event, one plausible reading o f  this passage. 's  Its general  
concern is with creative works that  occur without a creative agent: e.g., a work o f  art  
"without an artist." T h e  Prussian officer corps and the Jesuit  o rde r  are  held to be 
instances of  a similar phenomenon:  both are  institutions that  are, in obvious ways, self- 
maintaining and self-elaborating, yet there  is no identifiable locus of  agency within 
these institutions f rom which this "self-creation" issues--e .g. ,  we cannot say it is this 
one officer or  this one Jesui t  who is the casual agency behind  the sustenance and 
development  o f  the organizat ion as a whole. 
Nietzsche's provocative suggestion, then, is that the world as a whole is like these 
organizations in its capacity to maintain itself and  develop without there being any 
identifiable under ly ing  agency at work. The  world too, then, is like a "work o f  art" 
without an "artist," a creative work without  a creator.  
Interestingly, in the next section, WP, 797, Nietzsche observes that: "The  phenome-  
non 'artist '  is still the most t r a n s p a r e n t : - - t o  see th rough  it to the basic instincts o f  
power, nature,  etc.!" Tak ing  the two passages together,  then, the suggestion might  be 
this: The  work of  art  without  an artist  is possible precisely because the "artist" himself  is 
merely a cover for  "the basic instincts o f  power, nature";  it is these natural  instincts in 
turn that are  genuinely creative, but  they do not  add  up  to an autonomous,  creative 
agent. So, too, the world then should be unders tood  as sustaining itself and developing 
th rough  the opera t ion  of  these natura l  instincts, instincts that make a creative agent  
unnecessary. 
I do not want  to claim that this sketchy interpreta t ion exhausts the meaning  o f  
these difficult passages; but  it should suggest both (i) that their  concern is with the 
place of  creative agency in the w o r l d - - a n d  it is in this specific respect that the world is 
,5 A reading that owes much to perceptive comments by David Hills. 
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like the authorless work o f  a r t - - n o t  with aestheticism; and (ii) that they might  lend 
themselves to a more  naturalistic construal.  
(5) I f  we tu rn  to WP, 1o66, as Nehamas  suggests we do for clarification o f  WP, 
796, then we are  led even far ther  away from aestheticism. In WP, lo66, Nietzsche 
rejects mechanism, and claims instead that  "the world may be thought  o f  as a certain 
definite quanti ty o f  force and as a cer tain definite number  o f  centers of  force" which 
"in the great  dice game o f  e x i s t e n c e . . ,  must pass through a calculable number  o f  
combinations"; f rom this he derives his widely (and rightly) criticized cosmological 
in terpreta t ion o f  eternal  r e c u r r e n c e :  6 
Problems wih the cosmological version of  eternal  recurrence aside, the basic thrust  
of  this passage is simply to prof fer  an alternative theory o f  the constitution o f  the 
world, since "the mechanistic theory stands refuted" (emphasis added) ;  this passage 
does not  seem to lend any suppor t  to the view that  the world is a "work o f  art." Rather,  
Nietzsche claims that: (a) the mechanistic conception of  the world is false; and (b) his 
alternative cosmology is simply a bet ter  account o f  the world-order . '~  
(6) In the final chapter  o f  his book, Nehamas writes that: "To be beyond good and 
evil is to combine all of  one 's  features and qualities, whatever their  tradit ional  moral  
value, into a control led and coherent  whole. Nietzsche's conception is as a/ways [empha- 
sis added]  mode led  on his view of  l i terature  and the arts. He is so taken by this model  
that he even turns  historical figures into li terary characters  so that  he can at tr ibute to 
them the unity that  he finds essential to greatness? s And he is perfecdy aware o f  this 
dependence:  'The  phenomenon  "artist" is the most t r a n s p a r e n t : - - t o  see through it to 
the basic instincts o f  power,  nature,  etc.l Also those of  religion and morality! '  (WP, 
797). 'An anti-metaphysical  view of  the wor ld - -yes ,  but an artistic one '  (WP, lO48)" 
(~27). These  two passages are  invoked to suppor t  the proposi t ion that Nietzsche's 
model  for  his not ion of  "beyond good and evil" and  the greatness o f  certain historical 
figures is the l i terary text: that  he associates each of  these claims with appropr ia te  
l i terary analogues. 
But why then does Nehamas  cite WP, 797 ? H e  appears  to think that it illustrates 
Nietzsche's unders tand ing  o f  the dependence  o f  his t reatment  of  these claims on the 
li terary paradigm.  Now if  my read ing  in (4), above, was on target,  then WP, 797 is 
simply irrelevant  to Nehamas 's  claim h e r e - - a n d  Nehamas,  surprisingly,  quotes this 
obscure passage without even explaining how it suppor ts  his contention. 
Worse,  WP, 797 may actually a rgue  against Nehamas 's  aestheticism. For  if the artist 
,6 See, e.g., Arthur Danto, Niet~che as Philosopher (New York: Macmillan, 1965), Chapter 7- 
'7 For useful discussion, see Richard Schacht, Niet~che (London: Routledge, 1983), 169-86 
and Chapter 4; Robert Nola, "Nietzsche's Theory of Truth and Belief," Philosophy & Phenomeno- 
logical Research 47 ( 1987): 595-62. 
,s Nehamas even suggests that in the case of Caesar, Nietzsche is really thinking of Shake- 
speare's Caesar (227). This, however, is unlikely, as the following passage nicely illustrates, in 
which Nietzsche discusses "those enigmatic men predestined for victory and seduction, whose 
most beautiful expression is found in Alcibiades and Caesar (to whose company I should like to 
add thatfirst European after my taste, the Hohenstaufen Frederick II), and among artists perhaps 
Leonardo da Vinci" (BGE 2oo). Given the company Caesar is placed in here, it seems likely that in 
each case Nietzsche means the real historical figure, not some literary artifact of that person. 
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is simply yet another  ("transparent") manifestation of "the basic instincts of power, 
nature," then the art work itself must  reflect (in some sense) these same instincts. I f  
that is the case, then the "dependence-relat ion" really runs in the opposite direction: 
nature is not to be construed artistically; rather the work of art is to be understood 
naturalistically (as a product  of "the basic instincts of power, nature"). Something 
vaguely like this appears, in fact, to have been Nietzsche's view in his later aesthetic 
treatises. ~9 
(7) WP, lo48-which Nehamas quotes in its ent i re ty-- is  also ambiguous because 
Nietzsche says nothing here about what/t means to have an "artistic" view of the world. 
It could mean Nehamas's aestheticism, but this suggestion confronts two difficulties. 
First, WP, 1o48 speaks only of an "artistic" view of the world, not a "literary" view; hut 
Nehamas's aestheticism contends that it is literature in particular that informs Nietz- 
sche's unders tanding of the world, t~ Second, in light of  the prominent  passages in the 
work Nietzsche intended to publish expressing a naturalistic methodological agenda 
(e.g., BGE, 930; A, 14) such scant evidence as an ambiguous one-line remark from the 
Nachlass hardly seems adequate support  for aestheticism as the "single thread" r u n n i n g  
through Nietzsche's works. 
There  is, in any event, a better way of  unders tanding  WP, 1o48: for what it could 
also mean is that one should evaluate the world aesthetically, that one should assess its 
value in broadly aesthetic terms. Tha t  reading would be compatible with two Nietz- 
schean themes. First, it would fit Nietzsche's rejection of ordinary moral categories as 
evaluative terms (beyond good and evil, as he say, but not beyond good and bad [GM, I, 
17] ). And second, it is compatible with the appealing suggestion that what Nietzsche 
values about the "higher men" (who are thwarted by morality) is best described aestheti- 
cally: that we do, as Philippa Foot has noted, "find patterns of reaction to exceptional 
men that would allow us to see here a valuing rather similar to valuing on aesthetic 
grounds. "~t 
In sum, then, the two "best" pieces of textual evidence for aestheticism that 
~9 For example, in Nietz.sche contra Wagner, he declares: "My objections to the music of Wag- 
ner are physiological objections: why should 1 trouble to dress them up in aesthetic formulas? 
After all, aesthetics is nothing but a kind of applied physiology" ("Where I Offer Objections"; see 
also CW, Epilogue). Now the philosopher who believes (strange as it may seem) that aesthetics 
itself is "nothing but" a type of physiology is of course unlikely to think of assimilating the natural 
world to the literary one. 
9 o There is, of course, an irony here; for as Steve Burton and Richard Schacht have both 
reminded me, Nietzsche is far more concerned with musk than with literature. 
9 ~ See her "Nietzsche: The Revaluation of Values," in R. Solomon, ed., Nietzzche: A Collection 
of Cri~al Essays (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 163. This sort of reading 
would also fit with the most famous slogan of BT: "existence and the world seem justified only as 
an aesthetic phenomenon" (~4). Thus, the claim is not that the world is to be understood as though 
it shared the features of a work of art; rather it is to be eva/uated in aesthetic (as opposed to mora/) 
terms. That Nietzsche's real concern is to find an alternative, nonmoral mode of eva/uat/on of 
"existence and the world" comes out most dearly in the "Attempt at a Self-Criticism" that he 
added to the edition of BT of 1886. To the extent that Nehamas's aestheticism also embraces this 
claim about aesthetic evaluation (as it sometimes does: e.g., 39), it finds ample textual support; but 
this is not the aspect of aestheticism that Nehamas emphasizes throughout his study. 
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Nehamas  can f i n d - - W P ,  796, l o 4 8 - - a r e  both  ex t remely  ambiguous  one-  and  two- 
sentence  aphor i sms  f r o m  the  Nach/a.~. Th i s  is, at  best, dub ious  authori ty .  '~ I t  would  
appear ,  then,  that  N e h a m a s  has m a d e  aesthet ic ism a central  t h e m e  o f  his s tudy wi thou t  
be ing  able to locate a single passage in which Nietzsche clearly claims this phi losophica l  
d e v i c e - - u n d e r s t a n d i n g  the  world  as i f  it were  a l i terary t e x t - - a s  his own. ,s  
4.  
A significant par t  o f  the  interes t  and  appea l  o f  Nehamas ' s  book is due ,  o f  course,  to the  
ex t remely  c lever  way in which he  br ings  his aestheticist  m o d e l  to bear  on  var ious  
in te rpre t ive  ques t ions  in Nietzsche.  Discussing the d i f f e ren t  sorts o f  p rob lems  this 
approach  presents  is b e y o n d  the  scope o f  this paper ; '4  I shou ld  like to concen t ra te ,  
instead, on  one  par t icu la r  case, namely,  how aestheticism affects Nehamas ' s  r e ad ing  o f  
Nietzsche's  so-called "posi t ive ethics." Since there  are  a l ready  good  reasons  (as illus- 
t ra ted above) for  w o n d e r i n g  whe the r  Nietzsche is an aestheticist  at all, it may p rove  
,, Serious doubts about the canonical status of the Nach/ass have been raised in Bernd Mag- 
nus, "The Use and Abuse of  The W///to Pmoer," in R. Solomon and K. Higgins, eds., Reading 
N/ttmche (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). These doubts warrant, in my view, the 
following interpretive scruple: no view should be attributed to Nietz.sche for which the on/y 
support is in the Nach/asa. In this l ight--and ignoring the ambiguity of  the passages themselves-- 
Nehamas's reliance on two aphorisms from WP to buttress aestheticism is particularly unpersua- 
sive. (For a different view, however, of the status of the Nach/a.u, see Richard Schacht, "Nietzsche 
as Colleague," International Studies in Philosophy aa/a [1990]: 59-66.) 
9 s I can imagine a final objection on behalf of  Nehamas as follows: some of the criticism of 
aestheticism has depended on citing passages in which Nietzsche invoked science as a paradigm of 
inquiry. But science on Nietzsche's view (so the objection runs) is itself supposed to be construed 
on the model of the interpretation of literary texts; therefore, the quoted passages are of  a piece 
with aestheticism. 
The problems with this objection are twofold: (i) as noted before, interpretivism, even applied 
to science, is not enough to support aestheticism; science may be interpretive, but, at its best, it 
interprets a natural world with particular natural features--not a world that really shares the 
features of a literary text; (ii) it would strain the reading of the passages at issues--with their 
contrast of scientific methods with nonscientific ones, their prominent employment of  the lan- 
guage of "truth" and "reality"--to suggest that science is really of a piece with literary interpreta- 
tion in the aestheticist sense; to the contrary, these passages seem to depend precisely on the contrast 
between scientific methodologies and standards with nonscientific ones. 
Note, too, that: (i) the passages at issue are not from Nietzsche's putatively "positivist" phase 
(The Gay Science); they are from later works like Beyond Good and Ev/~ and The Antichrist; and (ii) 
Nietzsche/s, of  course, critical of  science, but his criticisms are confined (as noted earlier) largely 
to two closely related factors: (a) the moral prejudices that infect scientific theories; and (b) what 
he takes to be bad scientific cosmology (i.e., mechanism). Throughout his career, Nietzsche 
praises numerous scientific virtues; and he gets considerable mileage himself from the "naturalis- 
tic" conception of  man explored by the most culturally influential science of  his time, physiology. 
Consider, finally, this: if the subect matter of  the "putatively" naturalistic sciences was really 
analagous to a literary text what could it mean to construe art naturalistically, as Nietzsche does? 
If  nature is of a piece with art and texts, why would Nietzsche even suggest construing art 
naturalistically? What would the "reduction" of  one to the other amount to if they were essentially 
alike? These paradoxes are avoided if we refrain from saddling Nietzsche with aestheticism. 
,4 For some relevant discussion, see my "Perspectivism," as well as two papers I am now 
preparing for publication: "Beyond Good and Evil" and "Morality in the Pejorative Sense." 
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even  m o r e  p e r s u a s i v e  to f ind  t ha t  as a p p l i e d  to p a r t i c u l a r  views o f  Nie tzsche ' s ,  aes the t i -  
cism in fact  p r o d u c e s  id iosyncra t ic  resul t s .  
I ssues  r e l a t ed  to Nie tzsche ' s  pos i t ive  views a re  t r e a t e d  t h r o u g h o u t  Pa r t  II  o f  
N e h a m a s ' s  book ,  which  is c o n c e r n e d  qu i t e  genera l ly  wi th  " T h e  Self ."  A l t h o u g h  a 
n u m b e r  o f  t he  c la ims h e r e  s t r ike  m e  as ques t i onab le , i s  I will con f ine  m y  a t t e n t i o n  to 
wha t  I take  to be  N e h a m a s ' s  two c e n t r a l  i n t e r p r e t i v e  c o n t e n t i o n s :  
(i) t h a t  t he  ideal  p e r s o n  fo r  Nie tzsche  is like t he  ideal  l i t e ra ry  c h a r a c t e r :  " c o h e r e n t " ;  
a n d  
(ii) t h a t  Nie tzsche  n e i t h e r  p re sc r ibes  n o r  desc r ibes  t he  ideal  p e r s o n :  r a t h e r  h e  exem- 
p l i e s  such  a p e r s o n  a n d  l ife t h r o u g h  his  o w n  wri t ings .  
9 s Here are just  two examples, which warrant  at least some brief  comment: 
(t) Nehamas claims that  while the self on Nietzsche's view involves a "paradoxical interplay 
between creation and d i scover"  (168), it is ultimately the case that  "the self, even if it is to be at 
some point discovered, mustfirst be created" (174, emphasis added). Yet Nehamas defends this 
claim with a quotation that is chopped at a ra ther  misleading point: "The people who 'want m 
become those they are '  are precisely ' human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give 
themselves laws, who creage themselves' (GS, 335)" 074 ,  Nehamas's italics). GS, 335 continues, 
however, as follows: "To that end [of creating ourselves] we must become the best learners and 
discoverers of everything that is lawful and necessary [emphases added] in the world: we must 
become phys/c/sts in order  to be able to be creators in this sense . . .  " T h i s  suggests, then, that to be a 
creator "in this sense" is different than being a creator in Nehamas's sense. "Creation" for Nietz- 
sche is explicidy dependent  on discovering first what is "lawful and necessary": that is, discovering 
(as the preceding parts of  GS, 335 suggest) the lawful mechanisms underlying and determining 
our actions, induding,  presumably, our  "self-creating" actions. The  puzzle this presents, of 
course, is in what sense such "lawful" actions could constitute self-creation? And it is this puzzle 
that is obscured by the way Nehamas has presented the issue. (A similar puzzle is presented by 
Nietzsche's account of "self-mastery" in D, ~o9; I try to resolve them both in a paper 1 am now 
writing on "The Paradox of  Fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche.") 
(z) The  alternative to Nehamas's view, as he is well aware, is to see Nietzsche as thinking of  the 
self as essentially fixed by particular natural  and largely immutable properties. As one recent 
commentator  has aptly put  it: "Nietzsche believed the individual to b e . . .  the bearer of  innate 
drives and valuations, that can be nei ther  created nor  destroyed. At best these drives may be 
reordered,  rearranged,  and coordinated, stimulated or subordinated." As a result: "The self is 
not so much created as unfolded." Leslie Paul Thiele, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 199o), 907, 215. Now Nehamas tries to resist this sort of 
view by arguing, in part, that such a reading is incompatible with Nietzsche's "general denial of 
the idea of a reality that  underlies appearance" 073)-  But this sort of response rests on a confu- 
sion. Nietzsche's rejection of  the appearance-reality distinction is a rejection of the metaphysical 
distinction between the "merely" sensible realm and a suprasensible reality (as drawn, e.g., by 
Kant; see TI,  "How the True  World Finally Became a Fable"); it is certainly not a rejection of  the 
difference between superficial phenomena  (like consciousness) and underlying constitutive phe- 
nomena (like the ~drives" or the "body"; e.g., Z, "On the Despisers of the Body"; EH, I1, 9 ) - -  
where the latter are in principal knowable (and not metaphysically off-limits, like the thing-in- 
itself). Nehamas himself cites the passage from Z (251 n. 6), but mischaracterizes Nietzsche's view 
there as being that those who "despise" the body do so because of  "the belief that they do have a 
stable self." Worries about a stable self, however, are Nehamas's, not Nietzsche's; for Nietzsche 
says simply that the mistake of  those who despise the body is not to realize that  "behind [sense and 
spirit] still lies the self," i.e. the "body." 
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The  connection of the first of  these two claims with aestheticism should be apparent ;  
but  what of the second? Nehamas's idea, I take it, is that not only does Nietzsche look to 
the notion of a "literary character" as a model for his conception of  the ideal life, but  
that he also illustrates such an ideal life by "creat[ing] a[n ideal] character out of 
himself" (~53). The  literary character, then, on Nehamas's account, has proved not 
only to be Nietzsche's paradigm for the ideal person, but to be what Nietzsche himself 
becomes in order to offer this ideal life as a model for his readers. 
Nehamas's proposal here is certainly ingenious; but it is, I think, quite doubtful  
that there are any textua/grounds for thinking these aestheticist views are Nietzsche's. I 
shall try to illustrate these doubts in what follows. 
(A) According to Nehamas, Nietzsche "assimilates the ideal person to an ideal 
literary character and the ideal life to an ideal story" (165). This is because ideal literary 
characters have "coherence which Nietzsche imists is essential for people as well" (166, 
emphasis added). Surprisingly, Nehamas cites no text in suppor t  of  either of these 
claims. (Where, one wonders, does Nietzsche "insist" any of this?) One  passage that 
might seem related is GS, 29o- - the  famous passage on "giving style" to one's 
charac ter - -but  even there Nietzsche does not suggest that "style" is either: (a) primar- 
ily a "literary" matter (one gives style centrally "through long practice and daily work at 
it," i.e., through living a certain way); or (b) that it consists simply in "coherence." (Even 
in the literary context, of course, there is surely more to style than coherence!) 
Nehamas, then, has proffered no textual grounds for the strong claim that Nietzsche 
"insists" that " c o h e r e n c e . . .  is essential for people"; "6 nor any for the claim that Nietz- 
sche models his ideal person on the ideal (i.e., "coherent") literary character. 
(B) According to Nehamas, "Nietzsche's t e x t s . . ,  do not d e s c r i b e . . ,  his ideal 
character" (~3u).'7 Yet it seems, to the contrary, that Nietzsche repeatedly describes his 
ideal charac ter - -and  even says that he is doing so; for example, he writes: 
9 6 It is clear in the context of Nehamas's discussion what motivates this emphasis on coher- 
ence; for what Nehamas is really worried al:mut is that "someone might achieve Nietzsche's ideal 
life and still be nothing short of repugnant" 067). The aestheticist model here saves Nehamas's 
Nietzsche from simply being the advocate of the "morally repulsive" (167), for "a literary char- 
acter . . ,  may be a perfect character but (represent) a dreadful person"; but if we assume that 
Nietzsche "looks at people as if they were literary characters," then "we may be able to explain why 
he is so willing.., to leave the content of his ideal life unspecified" (166). Again, there seem to be 
no textual grounds for attributing this view to Nietzsche; and, in any event, one might wonder 
whether a worry about "moral repugnance" could be a Nietzschean worry. Although Nehamas is 
hardly the worst offender on this score, it is nonetheless troubling to see that moral indignation 
and judgment sometimes intrude into and distort his reading of Nietzsche's texts (e.g., 75, 206, 
215)- One suspects that Nietzsche himself would have expected as much. 
"~ I agree with Nehamas that Nietzsche does not offer prescriptions in any familiar sense 
(though see Richard Schacht's perceptive comments on this point in his Nietzsche, 475). I do not 
agree, though, that Nietzsche's positive views are "banal" (see 0~ 1-~2); and I note that Nehamas 
illustrates this arrogant assertion not with any quotes from Nietzsche but rather with a quote in 
which Arthur Danto gives an uncharitable description of Nietzsche's view. It seems to me, how- 
ever, that Nietzsche's actual descriptions of the types he admires and holds up as ideals are quite 
evocative and compelling. 
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What is it, fundamentally, that allows us to recognize who has turned out well? That  a 
well-turned-out person pleases our  senses, that he is carved from wood that is hard, 
delicate, and at the same time that smells good. He has a taste only for what is good 
for him; his pleasure, his delight cease where the measure o f  what is good for him is 
transgressed. He guesses what remedies avail against what is harmful;  he exploits 
bad accidents to his advantage; what does not kill him makes him stronger. Instinc- 
tively, he collects from everything he sees, hears, lives through,  h/s sum: he is a 
principle o f  selection, he discards much. He is always in his own company, whether 
he associates with books, human beings, or landscapes: he honors  by choosing, by 
admitting, by trusting. He reacts slowly to all kinds of  stimuli, with that slowness which 
long caution and delicate pride have bred in him: he examines the stimulus that 
approaches him, he is far f rom meeting it halfway. He believes neither in "misfor- 
tune" nor in "guilt": he comes to terms with himself, with others; he knows how to 
forget--he is strong enough;  hence everything must turn out for his best. 
Well then, I am the 0pp0s/t.e of  a decadent, for I have just described myself. (EH, 
II,  9) 
Note that here Nietzsche says explicitly (and contrary to Nehamas's contention) that he 
has just "descr/bed" a well-turned-out person (an "ideal" person)--namely,  himself. His 
work is full o f  comparably evocative descriptions 'S--making Nehamas's denial o f  their 
existence rather startling. 
(C) Since Nietzsche, on Nehamas's account, neither prescribes nor describes his 
ideal person, how then does he convey his positive views to his readers? Nehamas 
proposes the following answer: Nietzsche simply "produce[s] a perfect instance" o f  his 
ideal character (23o), namely, Nietzsche himself, "the character" that all his books "exem- 
plify" and "constitute" (232-33): "Nietzsche created a[n ideal] character out o f  him- 
self" (933). Again, however, Nehamas points to no text which would suggest that this is, 
in fact, how Nietzsche conceived his positive project. Moreover, this proposal depends 
on a problematic reading of  Nietzsche's final work, his autobiography, Ecce Homo. 
According to Nehamas, the way Nietzsche finally makes himself into this ideal 
character is, "after having written all these other books," he writes "'Ecce H o m o . . .  this 
self-referential book in which Nietzsche can be said with equal justice to invent or  to 
discover himself, and in which the character who speaks to us is the author who has 
created him and who is in turn a character created by or  implicit in all the books that 
were written by the author  who is writing this one" 096).  Let me suggest two grounds 
for skepticism about this interpretive proposal. First, it fails to take into account the 
central theme of  Ecce Homo, namely, that Nietzsche attributes his being an "ideal" or  
"well-turned-out" person to his being an essentially healthy organism (and not to his 
having simply written in such a way as to exemplify an "ideal" person). As Nietzsche 
puts it most simply: "I took myself in hand, I made myself healthy again: the condition 
for thismevery physiologist would admit that-- is  that one be healthy at bottom" (EH, I, 
2).,9 Similarly, he begins his autobiography by saying: "The good fortune o f  my exis- 
,s See, e.g., D, 2ol ; GS, 55; BGE, 287; WP, 943. 
9 t Note that this passage is then followed by the description of a well-turned-out person, 
quoted above in the text. 
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t e n c e . . ,  lies in its fatali ty" (EH,  I, 1); and  then  cont inues  by exp la in ing  (in part)  that:  
"My blood moves  slowly. N o b o d y  has every  d i scovered  any fever  in me  . . . .  T h e r e  is 
a l toge ther  no sign o f  any local d e g e n e r a t i o n ;  no organical ly cond i t i oned  s tomach com- 
plaint,  however  p r o f o u n d  the weakness  o f  my gastr ic system may  be as a consequence  
o f  over-al l  exhaus t ion"  (EH, I, l). For  Nietzsche,  then,  his be ing  a "wel l - tu rned-ou t"  
person  is i m p o r t a n d y  the  p roduc t  o f  "na tu ra l "  facts and not,  it seems,  o f  a l i terary 
endeavor.SO 
But  secondly,  Nehamas ' s  p roposa l  tha t  Nietzsche finally const i tutes  h imse l f  as an  
ideal "charac te r"  by wr i t ing  Ecce Homo has a qui te  bizarre  result .  For  since Nietzsche 's  
hav ing  a posit ive view at all d e p e n d s  on  his hav ing  in fact c o m p l e t e d  all his works  
t h r o u g h  Ecce Homo (so that  he  was p r o p e r l y  exempl i f i ed  in them),  it wou ld  seem then  
that for  Nietzsche to have  had  a posi t ive view at the  start o f  his ca ree r - - -o r  at any point 
prior to Ecce Homo---would  r equ i r e  that  he  have anticipated wri t ing the  series o f  books  
cu lmina t ing  with Ecce Homo tha t  he  actually wrotelst  Since: (a) this supposi t ion is surely 
implausible;  and  (b) N e h a m a s  has p r o d u c e d  no textual  reasons  fo r  cons t ru ing  Nietz-  
sche as he  suggests;  it seems likely that  Nehamas ' s  cleverly ar t icula ted  aestheticist  
proposa l  does  not,  in fact, c ap tu r e  Nietzsche's view.St 
Aesthet ic ism,  then,  has r u n  up  against  two difficulties: on the  o n e  hand,  t he r e  
appears  to be no  text  in which Nie tzsche  embraces  it; and  on the  o t h e r  hand ,  in at least 
one  case o f  app ly ing  aesthet icism, we have  seen that  the results  a re  ha rd ly  promis ing .  
This  suggests, pe rhaps ,  that  Nehamas  would  have  d o n e  well to heed  this early a d m o n i -  
so Throughout EH, Nietzsche is obviously having a bit of fun with these themes as well. 
Nonetheless, it is a mistake to write off--as,  e.g., Nehamas (see 12o) and Paul De Man (Allegories of 
Reading [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979], 119) do--Nietzsche's interest in physiological 
matters. Nietzsche himself remarks on the "blunder" that he "became a philologist--why not at 
least a physician or something else that opens one's eyes?" (EH, II, 2). And, of  course, the 
language of  physiology is simply omnipresent in Nietzsche's mature work. Here, again, a more 
historically sensitive reading of  Nietzsche would take into account the profound influence on 
German intellectual life in general (and Nietzsche in particular) of  physiology in the late nine- 
teenth century. See, again Hans Sluga, Frege, Chapter i. 
31 Even if we construe Nehamas's claim less strongly, so that it says only that Nietzsche 
constitutes himself as an ideal character through some number of his books (if not all of them 
right through EH), we still confront the problem that this view must suppose that Nietzsche 
amic/pated writing at least some number of books in order to properly constitute himself as a 
literary character. What evidence, one wonders, is there that Nietzsche thought anything like this? 
s, This, of course, also suggests that Nehamas's now well-known suggestion that the narrator 
of Proust's Remembrance of Things Past--"who creates himself, out of  everything that has hap- 
pened to him, in his own writing" (188)--is the right model for Nietz.~he's conception of self- 
creation, is untenable. In fact, if we look at what Nietzsche says about Goethe--who, as Nehamas 
notes, was Nietzsche's model of  someone who created himself (188)--it would seem that the 
Proust analogy gets things backwards. For on Nietzscbe's account, Goethe's self-creation appears 
to have involved living a certain wa~l, rather than creadng himself through wr/t/ng. And it was this 
"practical" self-creation that was a precondition of  his great artistic achievement--and not (as in 
the case of Proust's narrator) a product of  it (see TI, IX, 49-50). As Daniel Conway has put it: 
"Nietzsche urges us to admire Goethe not (primarily) for his creation of Werther and Faust, but 
for his se/f-creaZion, of which all else is derivative." "Overcoming the Ubermemch: Nietzsche's 
Revaluation of Values," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 20 (1989): 2 a8. 
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tion of  Nietzsche's: "Ar t  proceeds f rom man's natural  ignorance about  his interior  (in 
body and character):  it is not for physicists and philosophers" (HAH,  16o). 
5. 
I have concentra ted in this essay only on a negative thesis: namely, that there are 
reasons to doubt  whether  Nehamas has made an adequate  case for the view that 
Nietzsche is an aestheticist in his sense. In doing this, I have obviously had to ignore 
much o f  what makes Nietzsche: Life as Literature an interest ing and admirable  book. 
The re  are, for example ,  many really fine discussions o f  part icular  top ics - - fo r  exam- 
ple, Nietzsche's conception of  genealogy ( ] o 9 - ] 3 ) ,  the ascetic priest  ( ] ,2 ) ,  and the 
eternal  recurrence  (l 5 1 - 5 7 ) - - t h a t  have no equal anywhere in the voluminous litera- 
ture on Nietzsche. Yet the skepticism I have advocated about  whether  aestheticism is, 
in fact, a genuine  Nietzschean theme leads me to suspect the following: that fur ther  
examination o f  the sort carr ied out  here  will show that o ther  impor tan t  portions of  this 
always intell igent but  sometimes idiosyncratic book are not  really about  Nietzsche.ss 
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